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Negotiations over the rules governing the use of antidumping (AD) duties are 
occurring in both the World Trade Organization and the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas. Unfortunately, the goal of the negotiations is unclear, as some governments 
want to restrict the use of antidumping while others seek to maintain the ability of 
national governments to use antidumping measures. We hypothesize that members 
who desire to preserve the use of antidumping are active in initiating suits. To explore 
this hypothesis, we examine the positions taken by major actors in the negotiations, 
and their antidumping profiles. An antidumping profile includes data on a member’s 
AD actions, including investigations and measures the member initiates, as well as 
investigations and measures against the member’s exports. 
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C 
ountries are currently negotiating rules governing the use of antidumping (AD) 
duties in both the World Trade Organization and the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA). In both forums, the resources used by members to prepare and 
advance proposals, as well their public announcements, indicate that negotiations over 
AD are important to them. The attention devoted to this issue may spring from the 
striking global increase in the use of antidumping measures since the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round. Many WTO members have not yet adopted AD law, and if they do 
so the global use of AD measures is likely to increase even more. WTO members 
differ markedly in their use of antidumping measures. These differences may be 
attributed to differences in political ideologies, costs of initiating a case against 
alleged dumping, the availability of institutional support to help complainants, 
national methodologies for determining dumping margins and injury, and the ability of 
the investigating authorities to initiate and conduct investigations. Proposals advanced 
in the negotiations are likely to reflect these differences, as some members desire to 
maintain the ability of national governments to use antidumping measures, while 
others want to reform antidumping law to make it more difficult to impose 
protectionist measures. 
Many previous studies have evaluated the lack of an economic rationale for 
antidumping duties, and this paper will not address that well-worn ground. Our 
purpose is to discuss what kind of reform might emerge from the protracted 
negotiations on antidumping in the WTO and the FTAA. We also evaluate if proposals 
advanced by member countries are congruent with their use of antidumping. We 
hypothesize that members advocating for rules to preserve the use of antidumping 
measures by national governments are active in initiating suits. The position taken by 
these members is likely to reflect the sentiment that they benefit from maintaining 
antidumping measures in their current form, even though they are also subject to the 
imposition of duties by importers of their products. This paper will summarize the 
proposals presented in both forums to change the rules currently governing 
antidumping practices. The antidumping profiles of major players in the negotiations 
will be presented. An antidumping profile consists of a member’s AD actions taken 
against other WTO and FTAA members, including initiations, determinations, and the 
implementation of duties, as well as investigations and measures brought against the 
member’s exports. We will then assess if the anticipated relationship between the 
position taken in the negotiations and the member’s AD profile is evident.    L.M. Young and J. Wainio 
The Uruguay Round Antidumping Agreement  
T 
he Uruguay Round Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 
1994 (to be referred to as the Antidumping Agreement) contains more 
comprehensive rules governing the use of antidumping than its predecessor 
agreement. (Details on antidumping investigations are given in the technical annex.) 
The goal of increased consistency in the practices of national authorities was 
approached by including more detailed provisions covering a wider range of aspects 
of antidumping law. The agreement gives special treatment to developing countries, so 
that industrial countries are instructed to consider constructive remedies before the 
application of antidumping duties on imports from developing countries.  
  Similar to other Uruguay Round agreements, the Antidumping Agreement 
provides rules to increase the information available to members and to provide a 
forum for the early discussion and resolution of disputes. A Committee on 
Antidumping Practices was instituted, and one of its functions is to review the 
consistency of national practices with the Antidumping Agreement. Requirements that 
countries notify the committee of both antidumping actions and changes to their 
antidumping law were enacted to increase the information available to interested 
parties. Finally, the committee is to provide an arena for the discussion and informal 
resolution of disagreements between members. When informal discussion does not 
resolve an issue, members who believe that the antidumping actions of other members 
have violated WTO standards may use the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 
to press a complaint. The DSU is the mechanism by which WTO members resolve 
trade disputes between themselves with respect to compliance with their commitments 
to open their markets. The DSU is a rule-based system for resolving disputes, with 
strict timelines to ensure that members comply with their commitments and bring any 
measures inconsistent with their commitments into compliance. Ultimately, the 
effectiveness of the Antidumping Agreement depends on the effectiveness of the 
DSU.  
In several cases free trade areas have negotiated rules for trade remedy law that 
differ significantly from the WTO approach. One motivation given for the 
establishment of free trade areas is that in agreements between two or relatively few 
members it may be possible to remove more obstacles to economic integration than is 
possible in the WTO, with its large and diverse membership. As an example, in their 
bilateral free trade agreement, Chile and Canada eliminated the use of antidumping 
actions against each other (but not countervailing duty actions). 
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Trade Remedy Law and the Negotiations 
  N
egotiations on trade remedy law have been prompted by several factors, among 
them a concern that the increasing initiation of suits and use of antidumping 
duties are eroding the potential gains from the Uruguay Round Agreement. The 
negotiating mandate contained in paragraph 28 of the WTO Ministerial Declaration 
explicitly refers to “the increasing application of these instruments by Members” 
(WTO, 2001a). Miranda (2003) reports that initiations of antidumping investigations 
numbered 120 in 1987. Investigations trended upward after 1987, peaking at 366 in 
2001. They declined to 311 in 2002 and 210 in 2003.
1 Over the 1987–2003 period, the 
United States initiated the most investigations (668), followed by the European 
Community (530) and Australia (482). India, in fourth place with 394 investigations, 
was the leader among developing countries. Since 1995, developing countries have 
accounted for 60 percent of all investigations, with India taking over the number one 
spot from the United States as the most prolific user of antidumping laws. The 
increase in developing-country initiations is particularly striking; many developing 




Figure 1  Countries actively using antidumping law since early 1980s 
 
Figure 1 shows that the overall number of active users of these laws has grown 
from 8 in the early 1980s to 42 in the post–Uruguay Round period. Four of the 
countries that were users in 1980–84 and 1990–94 have become members of the EU 
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and now come under the EU’s antidumping policy and no longer initiate cases on their 
own. Five of the 42 recent users (the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and 
Slovenia) have also recently joined the EU. Not counting individual EU member 
countries, of the 133 WTO members as of October 2004, 76 had notified the WTO of 
having these laws on their books (WTO, 2004f). Twenty-eight additional potential 
users of antidumping laws had notified the WTO that they do not have national 
antidumping legislation. The remaining 29 members had not provided the WTO with 
any notification. 
Another impetus for consideration of antidumping rules in current WTO 
negotiations is developing-country dissatisfaction with the implementation of the 
WTO Antidumping Agreement. Some developing countries argue that they have not 
received the special consideration mandated by the agreement. Additionally, many 
developing countries claim that the liberal use of antidumping duties by industrial 
countries has undermined the potential for developing countries to benefit from trade 
liberalization (WTO, 2001b; Lima-Campos and Vita, 2004). One might posit that as 
developing countries increase their exports of products that have traditionally been 
most subject to antidumping investigations they would become more vulnerable to 
antidumping measures. The view that antidumping is a North-South issue, however, is 
not supported by examination of the use of antidumping actions nor, as we shall 
demonstrate, the positions taken within the WTO. Since 1995, developing-country 
importers have themselves conducted almost 60 percent of the investigations initiated 
against developing countries’ exports. 
WTO rules govern the use of antidumping duties by national authorities; however, 
variation exists in countries’ willingness to use antidumping duties and in their 
procedures and rules. This divergence in domestic institutions and rules means that the 
national authorities in some countries are able to protect their domestic industries to a 
greater degree than are other countries. Both the FTAA and the WTO negotiations are 
characterized by tension between national governments who desire to maintain their 
current ability to protect their domestic industries, and national governments who 
wish to curtail the growing use of antidumping measures. Some industrial countries 
are concerned that developing countries that have recently adopted antidumping law 
lack appropriate institutions and procedures (Miranda, 2003). However, many 
criticisms have also been levied over the procedures routinely used by the national 
authorities in industrial countries (Clarida, 1966; Finger, 1993; Horlick, 2003a; 
Wainio, Young, and Meilke, 2003). The relationship between a country’s level of 
economic development, its history of antidumping law, and its conformity to WTO 
accepted procedures is unclear. 
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Disagreement over the use of antidumping law is an important component of trade 
disputes. A WTO member may press a complaint against another member that they 
believe has violated WTO antidumping rules. Since 1995, 321 cases have been 
initiated under the Dispute Settlement Understanding. Of these, at least 111 cases 
were concerned with antidumping, countervailing duties, or safeguards, and 59 cases 
with antidumping measures alone.
2 
The WTO negotiations, occurring within the WTO Rules Negotiating Group, are 
focused on clarifying and modifying the rules governing antidumping investigations 
and determinations and the administration of antidumping duties. The carefully 
crafted mandate given to this group in the Doha Declaration reflects the dichotomy 
between countries whose firms have been targeted by AD laws and want the 
negotiations to be “aimed at clarifying and improving disciplines under the 
Agreements on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures,” and the users of these laws, who are interested in 
“preserving the basic concepts, principles and effectiveness of these Agreements.” In 
the initial phase of the negotiations, the participants were asked to “indicate 
provisions, including disciplines on trade distorting practices that they seek to clarify 
and improve in the subsequent phase” (WTO, 2001a, paragraph 28). There is no 
deadline for the Rules Negotiating Group prior to the conclusion of negotiations 
initially slated for January 2005.  
The FTAA negotiations are focused on many of the same issues addressed in the 
WTO; however, these negotiations must first decide to what degree FTAA rules 
should differ from those of the WTO. In the FTAA negotiations, the negotiating group 
on Subsidies, Antidumping and Countervailing Duties was given the mandate to 
“achieve a common understanding with a view to improving, where possible, the rules 
and procedures regarding the operation and application of trade remedy laws in order 
to not create unjustified barriers to trade in the Hemisphere” (FTAA, 1998). Several 
proposals in the draft chapter give special treatment to small economies, in contrast 
with WTO special and differential treatment for developing economies.  
Analysis of the FTAA negotiations and member negotiating positions has been 
hampered by the lack of publicly available position statements. In sharp contrast to the 
WTO, proposals are not systematically available on a central internet site. Only a few 
countries have made their negotiating positions available on the web; these include the 
United States, Canada, and Peru. Concerns expressed over the lack of transparency of 
the FTAA negotiations have resulted in greater consultations with business, but the 
lack of information available on country and bloc positions has not been addressed. 
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In both venues, negotiations on antidumping differ from those on other trade 
instruments, such as tariffs or export subsidies, in several dimensions. First, there is no 
agreement on the overall goal of the negotiations. Most WTO members profess 
support for reducing export subsidies and tariffs, and this goal is clearly stated in the 
mandate guiding the negotiations. In contrast, negotiations on antidumping are 
characterized by disagreement over the goal. Furthermore, negotiations on export 
subsidies and tariffs began with proposals containing numerical formulas and targets 
for negotiation. In the negotiations on antidumping, members attempt to achieve their 
goals by refinements to complex and detailed rules. While the goal behind 
introduction of a particular provision may be clear, it is difficult to ascertain the 
potential impact of a change to complex rules. 
Country and Bloc Negotiating Positions within the WTO 
I 
n the WTO negotiations on antidumping law, 33 countries have submitted papers 
on the provisions they desire to have introduced, clarified, or changed (WTO, 
2003b). The effectiveness of WTO disciplines on antidumping hinges on the language 
used to detail a multitude of provisions guiding the initiation, investigation, 
imposition, and termination of antidumping duties. Essentially, the negotiations are on 
details. 
Members Favouring Overall Maintenance of Antidumping  
The United States was opposed to the inclusion of antidumping in the current round of 
negotiations. The Clinton administration was prepared to forego the launch of the 
round at Seattle, if required, to keep antidumping off the agenda (Horlick, 2003b). 
Once it was clear that trade remedy laws would be part of the negotiating agenda, the 
Bush administration developed an aggressive strategy on antidumping that recognized 
U.S. agricultural producers, as well as other industries, were subject to an increasing 
number of suits by foreign governments. The United States is clearly the main 
defender of trade remedy laws as legitimate tools for addressing unfair trade practices 
that cause injury. The United States advocates not only strengthening the rules but 
also addressing the underlying causes of unfair trade practices, i.e., the trade-distorting 
practices that give rise to antidumping duties.  
The U.S. agenda seeks to discipline procedural aspects of trade remedy law by 
improving “transparency, predictability, and adherence to rule-of-law” to prevent U.S. 
firms from suffering from suits that are not administered in a manner consistent with 
WTO rules (WTO, 2003b). For example, the United States has proposed more 
detailed rules on the source and use of exchange rates used in the calculation of 
dumping (WTO, 2004a). The United States has also advanced a detailed set of 
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procedures to ensure access to non-confidential information (WTO, 2004b). 
Additionally, in keeping with its desire to ensure that duties are effective in protecting 
the domestic market, the United States supports provisions to prevent circumvention 
of antidumping duties by routing exports through third countries, and more stringent 
guidelines for new shipper reviews (WTO, 2004c). Since antidumping duties are 
levied against individual firms, reviews are done of new shippers to determine 
whether they are dumping. The United States seeks a way to more easily determine 
whether the new shipper is legitimate or merely a front used by a company that was 
already found to have been dumping.   
If a dispute on the application of antidumping law reaches the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB), the current WTO agreement states that the panel must find 
the national authorities to be in conformity with the agreement if its actions are based 
on an allowable interpretation of the rules. The United States wants further 
consideration of this provision to ensure that it is properly applied (WTO, 2003b), 
likely a concern due to past and potential challenges to its domestic practices through 
the WTO.  
The other main defender of antidumping laws is Egypt, which views the increased 
number of antidumping suits by developing countries as legitimate and a reflection of 
an increased capacity in developing countries to defend their producers against 
industrial-country practices. Egypt supports the U.S. concern over circumvention. 
Finally, Egypt argues that further elaboration of WTO antidumping law is unlikely to 
prevent abuse, and that additional complexity is a burden to developing countries 
(WTO, 2003b; WTO, 2003c) and may prevent national authorities from exercising 
judgment when appropriate. 
Members Favouring Increased Disciplines on Antidumping 
The “Friends of Antidumping Negotiations” is a coalition that has submitted 
numerous and detailed proposals to the WTO negotiations (ICTSD, 2003; WTO, 
2003b) seeking to curtail the use of antidumping law. This coalition includes Brazil, 
Chile, China, Columbia, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Korea, Norway, 
Mexico, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, and the Separate Customs 
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. This group may have had its 
genesis in a coalition of countries brought together to oppose U.S. legislation (the 
Byrd Amendment) that gives antidumping duties collected to the U.S. firms that 
petitioned to initiate an investigation. 
Friends seeks an explicit prohibition of the practice of zeroing. Currently, this 
practice means that positive dumping margins are included in calculations, but 
“negative” dumping margins – when the export price is higher than normal value – are 
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not. Using a sample of U.S. cases, Lindsey and Ikenson (2002) estimated that 
eliminating this practice would reduce dumping margins by nearly 87 percent. In a 
case brought against the European Union by India involving bed linens, the WTO 
ruled in 2001 against the use of zeroing, stating that it violated WTO rules by not 
taking into account all comparable export transactions. The WTO made a similar 
ruling in a 2004 case against the United States involving softwood lumber. While 
these rulings support the position taken by Friends to eliminate zeroing, it will be up 
to the negotiators to determine whether it should be completely disallowed within the 
Antidumping Agreement. Some countries have suggested that, in order to clarify and 
improve the Antidumping Agreement, some key aspects of the interpretation of recent 
panels should be incorporated into the agreement (WTO, 2004e). Currently there is no 
procedure for incorporating panel results into WTO agreements. Changes to 
agreements are made as a result of multilateral negotiations requiring agreement by 
consensus.  
Friends also seeks elaboration of rules governing constructed costs. Clarida 
(1996) states that in the United States, 30 percent of the dumping cases were evaluated 
during 1979–86 on the basis of constructed value, and dumping was found in 89 
percent of those cases. Clarida further argues that the use of constructed costs has 
become standard in dumping investigations even though it is supposed to be used as a 
last resort. 
Proposals submitted by Friends request elaboration of the rules governing a wide 
range of definitions and practices in investigations with the intent of standardizing 
practices and preventing abuse by national authorities. In this vein, their proposals 
include requests for further rules on the definition of sufficient quantities of the sale of 
like products; clarification of issues with affiliated suppliers (WTO, 2004d); when 
authorities must accept cost data from producers’ accounting books; further 
refinements to the definition of the scope of the product under investigation; and many 
more.  
Many proposals, from Friends and other members, have requested detailed rules 
on how to establish a causal relationship between dumping and injury. Currently, in 
order to impose antidumping duties, the national authorities must first determine that 
dumping has occurred and then must show that the domestic industry has suffered 
injury, including material injury or its threat, or the material retardation of the 
domestic injury. The WTO gives guidance on factors to be considered, including the 
volume and price impact of dumped imports and, consequently, the impact on prices 
in the domestic industry. However, no guidance is given on how to weigh relevant 
factors or on how causality between relevant factors and injury is to be determined. 
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The GATT/WTO has debated how to prove that dumping is the primary cause of 
injury since 1947 (Clarida, 1996).  
The European Union and Japan submitted a proposal that expresses concern over 
the escalating cost of responding to antidumping suits. They propose to develop a 
standard format for antidumping rules to reduce the cost of investigations for both 
government and industry. They argue that excessive information requirements, 
inadequate procedural and unclear substantive rules add to the cost of investigations, 
and that standardization would reduce costs (WTO, 2003b). The EU and other parties 
have also proposed implementation of a lesser duty rule, which specifies that if the 
duty required to alleviate injury is lower than that to alleviate dumping, the lower duty 
should be imposed. Both Mexico and the Canada–Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement 
have lesser duty rules, providing precedence for this proposal. The EU has also 
advanced a proposal for the implementation of a public interest test before the 
implementation of duties. A public interest test is simply the consideration of the 
impact of an antidumping duty on broader interests, including affected downstream 
industries and consumers. The EU and several other countries currently maintain a 
public interest clause in their domestic antidumping legislation.  
India has submitted several proposals on antidumping provisions (WTO, 2003b). 
India argues that developing countries have not received the treatment specified in the 
Uruguay Round Antidumping Agreement, and advances specific rules to remedy this. 
Proposals applicable only to developing countries include increasing the de minimus 
requirement for the level of dumping from 2 to 5 percent and increasing the negligible 
import level from 3 to 5 percent. India proposes to make the application of the lesser 
duty rule mandatory when duties are being considered by industrial countries against 
imports from developing countries. As noted in the introduction, India has become the 
world’s most active user of antidumping law, which may explain its lack of 
involvement in the Friends coalition. However, like Friends, India has also advanced 
proposals to restrict the use of zeroing, to ensure that injury is addressed instead of 
dumping, and to restrict the profit margin used by national authorities in the 
determination of dumping. 
Country and Bloc Negotiating Positions within the 
FTAA 
T 
he United States has argued that the FTAA should not adopt antidumping rules 
that differ from those of the WTO, for “There are serious practical, as well as 
policy, problems with establishing a different AD/CVD regime within the FTAA” 
(USTR, 2001), a position also taken by the United States during negotiations over 
NAFTA. The United States position within the FTAA is to limit negotiations on 
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antidumping to procedural matters (USTR, 2001). Additionally, the United States 
opposes differential treatment for small economies. 
The Mercosur countries and Chile succeeded in ensuring that the original 
negotiating mandate left open the possibility that FTAA rules on antidumping might 
differ from WTO rules (SICA-IBFD Project, 2001). Mercosur desires that the FTAA 
gradually phase out the use of antidumping practices until totally eliminated within 
the free trade area (Latin American Council, 2001). In lieu of this, they suggest that a 
second best solution would be to differentiate between countries based on the size and 
level of development of their economy, and have proposed several provisions to 
achieve this.  
Brazil has publicized its goal of increased disciplines on antidumping in general 
(Barbosa, 2001) and specifically its dissatisfaction with U.S. antidumping duties on 
several Brazilian products. However, the details of Brazil’s specific goals for the 
FTAA negotiations have not been made public. Brazil believes that a regional trade 
agreement should facilitate more creative options than those taken in the WTO (Lima-
Campos, 2003). 
Each of the three draft FTAA chapters contains a bracketed provision eliminating 
the use of antidumping provisions once restrictions on the circulation of goods are 
lifted. Lack of public access to proposals and to minutes of committee discussions 
makes it impossible to ascertain how much support exists for eventual elimination of 
antidumping measures in the FTAA; however, opposition is evident in both the U.S. 
and Canadian positions.  
The Antidumping Profile of Major Players in the 
Negotiations 
A 
s already mentioned, there has been a significant increase in the number of 
countries using antidumping law since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. 
There has also been an increase in overall antidumping activity as reflected in both 
investigations and the imposition of new antidumping measures.
3 Between 1995 and 
2003, 2,416 cases were initiated by 41 importers against 97 exporters.
4 This 
represented a 38 percent increase in cases over the previous nine-year period, during 
which there were 1,746 investigations by 25 importers against 90 exporters. The 
growth is more striking when countries’ antidumping actions are considered in terms 
of measures imposed. Thirty-eight countries reported imposing 1,511 new 
antidumping measures against 85 exporters between 1995 and 2002. Between 1986 
and 1994, only 18 countries reported imposing 783 measures against 62 exporters. 
The number of new measures imposed has increased by 93 percent during the post–
Uruguay Round period. The chances that an investigation would result in a measure 
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(an antidumping duty or undertaking) increased from 45 percent between 1986 and 
1994 to 63 percent between 1995 and 2003. 
Table 1 summarizes antidumping activity by and against those countries that 
actively used antidumping laws during the 1995–2003 period. In table 1, countries are 
ranked in importance based on the number of investigations initiated during the 
period. As already noted, India emerged during this period as the heaviest user of 
these laws. The next most active user by both indicators was the United States, 
followed by the European Union. The top ten countries accounted for more than three-
quarters of the cumulative total of investigations and almost 80 percent of all 
measures. As a group, they initiated and imposed more than twice as many cases and 
measures as they faced during the period. 
One might expect that those countries most in favour of reforming antidumping 
laws would not themselves be heavy users of these laws, and only two members of the 
Friends group, Brazil and China, are found among the top ten. China, the tenth most 
active user of AD laws, is also the favorite target of other countries. As the only 
country in the top ten that faced more investigations of its exports than it initiated 
against others, China clearly has a strong incentive for tighter disciplines on use of 
antidumping duties. Brazil would also seem to have a stronger incentive for greater 
disciplines on antidumping than the other countries in the top ten. Although Brazil 
initiated 50 percent more cases against other countries than were initiated against it, 
the “success ratio” (chances that an investigation resulted in the imposition of a duty 
or undertaking) in Brazil was only slightly over 50 percent. In contrast, there was a 75 
percent rate of imposition of duties on Brazil’s exports from investigations by 
importers. As a result, the number of measures imposed by Brazil was almost equal to 
the number of measures it faced worldwide. 
Six other members of the Friends group (Chile, Korea, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, 
and Thailand) were in a situation similar to China’s. Their exports were the target of 
numerous investigations (558) and measures (352), while they were much less likely 
to investigate (114) other exporters or impose measures against them (70). Colombia, 
Costa Rica, and Israel, however, were more active users of antidumping law than they 
were targets of these laws by other countries. 


















India 379  273  72%  98  50  51%  3.9  5.5 
United States  329  205  62%  135  73  54%  2.4  2.8 
European Union  274  187  68%  52  32  62%  5.3  5.8 
Argentina 180  138  77%  16  9  56%  11.3  15.3 
South Africa  166  108  65%  50  34  68%  3.3  3.2 
Australia 163  50  31%  17  6  35%  9.6  8.3 
Canada 122  72  59%  25  12  48%  4.9  6.0 
Brazil 109  58  53%  71  55  77%  1.5  1.1 
Mexico 73  62  85%  33  18  55%  2.2  3.4 
China, P.R.  72  37  51%  356  254  71%  0.2  0.1 
Turkey 61  61  100%  34  21  62%  1.8  2.9 
Korea, Rep. of  59  33  56%  182  107  59%  0.3  0.3 
Indonesia 54  14  26%  99  53  54%  0.5  0.3 
Peru  48 26  54%  2   0%  24.0 -- 
New Zealand  42  12  29%  8  3  38%  5.3  4.0 
Egypt 38  29  76%  10  4  40%  3.8  7.3 
Thailand 31  24  77%  91  57  63%  0.3  0.4 
Venezuela 31  24  77%  18  11  61%  1.7  2.2 
Malaysia 28  16  57%  48  28  58%  0.6  0.6 
Israel 26  15  58%  7  4  57%  3.7  3.8 
Colombia 23  11  48%  5  2  40%  4.6  5.5 
Philippines 17  9  53%  6  4  67%  2.8  2.3 
Chile 14  6  43%  23  13  57%  0.6  0.5 
Poland 12  9  75%  25  18  72%  0.5  0.5 
Trinidad & 
Tobago  12 6  50%  3  3  100%  4.0  2.0 
Taiwan 8  2  25%  123  79  64%  0.1  0.0 
Lithuania 7  7  100%  10  3  30%  0.7  2.3 
Latvia 7  1  14%  7  7  100%  1.0  0.1 
Costa Rica  6  1  17%  2    0%  3.0  -- 
Uruguay 6  1  17%  2  1  50%  3.0  1.0 
Czech Republic  3  1  33%  18  13  72%  0.2  0.1 
Jamaica 3  3  100%        --  -- 
Japan 2  3  150%  106  76  72%  0.0  0.0 
Pakistan 2  2  100%  9  4  44%  0.2  0.5 
Nicaragua 2  1  50%  1   0%  2.0  -- 
Panama 2    0%        --  -- 
Bulgaria 1    0%  11  9  82%  0.1  0.0 
Guatemala 1 1  100%  2 1  50%  0.5  1.0 
Slovenia 1    0%  2  1  50%  0.5  0.0 
Ecuador 1    0%  1  2  200%  1.0  0.0 
Paraguay 1  1  100%  1  2  200%  1.0  0.5 
Singapore   2    33  20  61%  --  0.1 
Total 2,416  1,510             
*The success ratios are imprecise estimates based on dividing measures imposed during the 
period by investigations. Some measures in the early years stem from cases initiated before 
1995, while some cases initiated late in the period had not yet been decided at period end. This 
is why both Japan and Singapore have more measures than investigations. 
Source: WTO (2004e) 
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  L.M. Young and J. Wainio India, which has become the heaviest user of these laws, has proposed changes 
that would limit the ability of other countries to impose measures against itself and 
other developing countries. The United States, the most vocal proponent of preserving 
and strengthening the ability of governments to use antidumping law, is the second 
heaviest user of such law. Prior to the Uruguay Round the United States was the 
heaviest user by virtually any indicator (U.S. CBO, 2001). Since 1995, the number of 
investigations has averaged 36.6 per year, and the average number of new measures 
enacted is 22 per year. In terms of active measures in place on December 31, 2003, the 
United States still ranked first in the world with 359 against other countries versus 50 
measures against it – a ratio of over 7 U.S. measures for each foreign measure against 
the United States. 
Among other countries that have tabled proposals within the WTO Rules 
Negotiating Group, recall that the EU and Japan were interested in reining in the 
escalating cost of responding to antidumping suits. For both, the greatest proportion of 
suits they faced were initiated by the United States, where the costs of defending 
oneself in an antidumping investigation are reported to be in the millions of dollars.  
Developing countries were the subject of 826 investigations by their fellow 
developing countries while facing only 579 investigations initiated by industrial 
countries. They also were more apt to have an antidumping duty imposed against their 
exports to developing countries. In investigations initiated by developing countries 
against developing countries, measures were imposed in 67 percent of all cases (553), 
while only 56 percent (323) of the cases against their exports to industrial countries 
ended up in final measures being imposed.  
Table 2 includes data for all countries that have faced antidumping actions but 
have not been active users of these laws. (The exceptions here are the members of the 
EU, found at the bottom of table 2. A member of the EU cannot initiate an 
antidumping suit as an individual country, but must use processes at the EU level. 
Many countries, however, bring their cases against either the EU as a whole or against 
individual EU member states.) Some of the countries in table 2 have antidumping 
laws on the books but have not used them, while others have notified the WTO that 
they have yet to codify these laws.
5 Within table 2, the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, including the republics of the Former Soviet Union, would appear to 
have the strongest argument for seeking restraints on antidumping. As a group, 
exports from these countries faced 252 investigations of alleged dumping and 200 
antidumping measures. When facing an investigation, the odds were four to one that 
they would lose the case and face measures. This compares with overall “success 
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ratios” of 62 percent against developing countries’ exports (59 percent if China is 
excluded) and only 56 percent against the exports of industrial countries. 
 
Table 2  Investigations and Measures against All Other Countries, 1995–2003 
 
Exporting country  Investigations  Measures  Success ratio 
Russia 86  71  83% 
Ukraine 51  47  92% 
Kazakstan 22  18  82% 
Romania 32  22  69% 
Hong Kong  18  11  61% 
Hungary 14  7  50% 
Iran   13  4  31% 
Saudi Arabia  13  4  31% 
Belarus 10  9  90% 
Slovak Republic  10  7  70% 
Macedonia 7  4  57% 
United Arab Emirates  7  3  43% 
Viet Nam  6  4  67% 
Switzerland 5    0% 
Croatia 4  4  100% 
Estonia 4  2  50% 
Norway 4  1  25% 
Yugoslavia 4  2  50% 
Moldova 3  4  133% 
Algeria 2  2  100% 
Cuba 2  1  50% 
Faroe Islands  2    0% 
Libya 2  1  50% 
Macau 2    0% 
Nepal 2  2  100% 
Uzbekistan 2    0% 
Zimbabwe 2  1  50% 
Bahrain 1    0% 
Bangladesh 1  1  100% 
Bosnia Herzegovina  1  1  100% 
Dominican Republic  1  1  100% 
Georgia 1  1  100% 
Honduras 1  1  100% 
Jordan 1  1  100% 
Korea, PDR  1    0% 
Liechtenstein 1  1  100% 
Malawi 1  1  100% 
Mozambique 1    0% 
Nigeria 1    0% 
Continued on following page
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Exporting country  Investigations  Measures  Success ratio 
Oman 1  1  100% 
Qatar 1  1  100% 
Serbia & Montenegro  1  1  100% 
      
EU Members       
  Germany  74  35  47% 
  Italy  42  25  60% 
  United  Kingdom  40  21  53% 
  Spain  39  20  51% 
  France  35  24  69% 
  Netherlands  25  13  52% 
  Belgium  18  13  72% 
  Austria  12  6  50% 
  Sweden  12  6  50% 
  Finland  9  4  44% 
  Denmark  6  4  67% 
  Greece  6  3  50% 
  Portugal  6  4  67% 
  Ireland  4  2  50% 
  Luxembourg  2    0% 
Source: WTO (2004e) 
Conclusions 
T 
he growing use of antidumping actions to protect domestic industries has 
occurred during the same time as tariff reductions and trade liberalization under 
the Uruguay Round Agreement. There exists widespread concern that antidumping 
measures are both misapplied and used to protect domestic industries. With this in 
mind, negotiators in the WTO and FTAA talks are attempting to amend and improve 
certain provisions of the WTO Agreement on Antidumping to clarify the rules in an 
effort to assure that as trade barriers are further eliminated, market access is not 
circumvented by the inappropriate use of these laws. 
The antidumping talks are without doubt one of the most politically sensitive 
negotiating issues for the United States at the WTO. After unsuccessfully trying to 
keep antidumping off the WTO agenda, U.S. negotiators find themselves virtually 
alone in the talks in Geneva. At the same time, they are faced in Washington with a 
Congress that cares deeply about this issue and that has indicated that U.S. 
antidumping laws are not negotiable.
6 Even though antidumping is on the agenda, a 
fundamental lack of agreement continues over the goal of the negotiations. While 
many countries desire to restrain national authorities’ ability to use antidumping duties 
to provide protection for import-competing industries, the United States insists that 
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the negotiations are to clarify and strengthen global trade rules against unfair trade 
practices. 
A perennial criticism leveled against the United States in international trade 
negotiations is aimed at its use of antidumping remedies (U.S. CBO, 2001). Even 
within the United States, studies examining the use of antidumping tend to be critical 
of the procedures used by the U.S. investigating authorities to calculate margins of 
dumping. Specifically, they conclude that the U.S. methodology often results in a bias 
toward higher margins, and therefore higher import duties, than is warranted by 
economic theory, and in some cases by the WTO Agreement on Antidumping itself. 
Many of the proposals submitted by the negotiating parties within both the WTO and 
FTAA talks target aspects of the antidumping codes that could affect the ability of the 
United States to investigate alleged dumping and impose antidumping duties. 
But some observers have expressed concern over how effective more detailed 
provisions would be in curbing the use of antidumping laws. For example, “Egypt 
considers that any proposal to substantially alter or change the substance or character 
of the present Antidumping Agreement through the use of more complex and more 
stringent rules regarding the investigation will not prevent a member from misusing 
the antidumping agreement if it truly wishes to do so” (WTO, 2003d), a view held by 
some analysts as well (Clarida, 1996). The National Foreign Trade Council, a U.S. 
business organization, argues that a new agreement should provide core principles 
instead of technical details (Bureau of National Affairs, 2003). Finger (2002) argues 
that the agreement should avoid sanctifying procedures that compare the situation of 
the petitioner with pre-established criteria for relief, and that the public review should 
identify the totality of costs and benefits from the proposed duty. These concerns are 
perhaps best summarized by Leebron (1996), who argues that as long as the 
institutions differ it is likely that the implementation of rules will differ. He posits that 
increasing the uniformity in rule implementation is best achieved by moving the 
responsibility to supranational organizations. 
Despite, or perhaps due to, the concern over antidumping expressed by 
government officials, academics, and industry, the WTO does not appear to be making 
progress in the Doha negotiations. Between 2002 and mid 2004 nearly 150 position 
papers were submitted to the WTO Committee on Rules for changes to the WTO 
Antidumping Agreement. However, no public document indicates that the committee 
has even reached a framework for negotiations, and recent documents indicate that 
parties remain far apart on the goal of the negotiations. In addition, relatively little 
analytical work (with the exception of Lindsey and Ikenson) has been done to assist 
negotiators in evaluating the consequences of various proposals, or even to rank them 
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in terms of importance. This stands in sharp contrast to the negotiations on tariffs, in 
which the academics and multilateral institutions have examined in detail the 
consequences of different formulas for tariff reduction. Other highly technical WTO 
issues, such as the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, include criteria to guide 
member decisions, as SPS regulations “must be based on science.” Progress on 
antidumping in the WTO depends critically on agreement of a goal for the 
negotiations and criteria for the rules. Until that occurs negotiators are unlikely to 
progress, as the negotiations appear to be focused on creating uniformity in rule 
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Endnotes 
                                                       
*    The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect 
those of their institutions. 
1.    The 2003 total is based on notifications by members through the first quarter of 
2004 and is incomplete to the extent that some members had not yet submitted 
notifications.  
2.    Calculated by the authors, by viewing the titles of the disputes compiled by the 
WTO, as of December 1, 2004, under the Uruguay Round Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). As the title 
may not include the relevant phrases, this procedure could underestimate the 
number of trade remedy suits. A list of disputes is available on the WTO website 
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm.   
3.    Measures are imposed only if there are findings of dumping and material injury to 
domestic producers. 
4.    Cases against the European Union as a whole are counted as one case, even 
though 15 countries are affected. 
5.    Not all of these countries are members of the WTO, so would not have notified 
the WTO of remedies taken nor would they be part of the WTO database on 
antidumping. We are not aware, however, that any of them have used 
antidumping laws in the past. 
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  The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and not those of the 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy nor the Estey Centre 
for Law and Economics in International Trade. © The Estey Centre for Law and 
Economics in International Trade. 
6.    Prior to the meeting in Doha, Qatar, Congress voted 410–4 on a resolution 
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